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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the case at hand, Summary Judgment was improperly granted
for Defendants based on their assertions that Plaintiffs had not
suffered a compensable injury and that there was no material
issue of fact for the trier of fact to decide.

Plaintiffs refute

both of these premises and request that their action be
reinstated.

There remain many genuine issues of fact to be

resolved, including:

the extent of Plaintiff's injuries, present

and future; the extent and reasonableness of Plaintiff's
emotional distress and fear of cancer; and the medical necessity
and extent of future monitoring for asbestos related disease.
Plaintiffs have suffered a compensable injury resulting from
defendants negligence.

Plaintiffs have undisputedly been

exposed to large quantities of concentrated asbestos dust.
Numerous courts have correctly recognized the exposure to known
toxic substances, including asbestos, as an injury at law.
Courts have relied upon the overwhelming medical data which
establishes that victims exposed to asbestos face reduced
physical capacity beginning as soon as 6 months after exposure.
A large percentage of victims will also die prematurely due to
asbestos induced cancer and/or asbestosis.
Although the general public may have an occasional encounter
with small amounts of asbestos, Plaintiffs' exposure was intense
and constant, and far from the casual exposure that Defendants
suggest.

In fact, Plaintiffs inhalation of asbestos occurred for

many hours a day over two months, in clouds so thick they
1

frequently had to stop work to clear their airways and wipe it
from their glasses, (R.476-477, 006.)
The Plaintiffs received a toxic injury as a direct result of
the breach of duty defendants owed their workers to provic
toxin-free work environment.

a

Had the general public askec ibout

the contents of the toxic dust and then relied on the false
assurances of the Defendant that it was inert, they too would
be outraged.
The circumstances of Plaintiffs1 toxic exposure are
outrageous.

Mountain Fuel denied the existence of asbestos

during their renovation project, assuring plaintiffs that the
dust permeating their work space was inert, negligently refusing
to test it, when in fact it was highly concentrated asbestos.
Many legal commentators have addressed the seeming inability
of tort law to properly deter toxic offenders and compensate
victims, noting that for some, it is less expensive to risk
exposing workers, than to have the hazards safely removed.

This

appears to be the case with Mountain Fuel, whose representatives
were more concerned with losing tax credits than making their
basement project safe for workers.

(R.007).

Exposure to asbestos causes severe respiratory impairment,
cancer and death.

The latency period between exposure and

manifest disease can be many years, allowing those responsible
for negligent exposure to escape any payment of compensation for
2 0+ years.

Even when plaintiffs become fatally ill, offenders

may not be required to pay because of the difficulty of proving
2

causation so long after exposure.

In response, courts are

recognizing the barriers faced by legitimate toxic tort victims
and attempting to adjust tort law to equitably address injury by
toxic tort. This includes recognizing the invasion of the body by
a toxic substance as an injury, providing a quantifiable basis
for recovery.

In cases of injury similar to Plaintiffs', courts

have allowed victims to recover for fear of cancer, emotional
distress proximately caused by the negligent exposure, fear of
disease, emotional distress associated with increased medical
monitoring, and for medical surveillance.

These represent the

major theories whereby the courts may deter toxic
irresponsibility and compensate unconsenting victims.
In light of the many material issues of fact, Plaintiffs
believe the trial court improperly awarded summary judgment.
Plaintiffs respectfully request that their action be remanded to
the trial court to resolve the genuine issues of fact that have
been raised in this case.
ARGUMENT
I.

THERE EXISTS ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Summary judgment is appropriate under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c)
fact.

only when there is no genuine issue of material

Defendants state in their brief that, "In the present case

Plaintiffs have introduced absolutely no evidence that would
raise an issue of material fact". (Brief of Appellee at 13).
This is simply not true.

Summary judgment was improperly

granted, because there is evidence before the court to raise
3

numerous issues of material fact.
According to Defendants1 brief, Dr. Battigelli stated that
M

[t]he workers by and large denied acute bouts of coughing,

choking and related symptoms which would suggest overwhelming
exposure." (R.373) (Brief of Appellees at 4).

These statements

are directly controverted by Plaintiffs in their depositions and
interrogatories.

For example, Plaintiff Hansen stated that he

experienced coughing, respiratory distress, chest tightness,
headache and eye irritation as a result of the immediate exposure
to asbestos. (R.251).

Plaintiff Hilton stated that he

experienced coughing, wheezing, tightness in the chest, and eye
irritation during the period of asbestos exposure. (R.271-72).
Plaintiff Silcox experienced severe coughing and respiratory
distress, chest tightness, headaches, and severe eye irritation".
(R.309-310).

Plaintiff Vickers experienced coughing, wheezing,

shortness of breath, chest tightness, headaches and severe eye
irritation. (R.328).

In the face of these complaints, Dr.

Battigellifs report states that he did not find "any evidence of
adverse effects" from the asbestos exposure.

These conflicting

statements certainly raise genuine issues of material fact.
Other issues of material fact include the extent of
Plaintiffs1 injuries.

Plaintiffs continue to experience "adverse

effects" from the exposure to asbestos.

Plaintiff Hansen

continues to experience shortness of breath and re-occurring
chest colds, (R.242-43).

Plaintiff Silcox continues to suffer

from congestion, coughing and shortness of breath, all due to
4

exposure to the insulation containing asbestos (R.468).
Plaintiff Vickers continues to suffer from wheezing and shortness
of breath.

Once again, these statements contradict Dr.

Battigelli's statement that Plaintiffs' exposure to asbestos was
"perhaps inconsequential" (R.372-74), clearly raising another
issue of material fact.
Another issue of fact is whether the Plaintiffs' emotional
distress is reasonable.

Each Plaintiff has suffered from severe

anxiety associated with the uncertainty of their future medical
condition, and they all anticipate undergoing periodic testing
for asbestos related disease.

Plaintiff Hansen experienced

anxiety and sleeplessness, worrying about potential injury.
(R.243).

Plaintiff Hilton stated that he suffered "loss of

sleep, worrying about what might happen in the future due to
exposure to asbestos". (R.272).

Plaintiff Mackintosh experienced

severe anxiety regarding his future medical condition. (R.292).
Plaintiff Vickers experienced severe anxiety associated with the
uncertainty of his future medical condition, (R.321-22).
Medical monitoring for asbestos related exposure, raises yet
more issues of material fact.

There is extensive medical

literature before the court regarding the medical necessity of
monitoring for victims of asbestos exposure.

The overwhelming

majority of literature indicates that medical monitoring is
required beyond the scope of routine check-ups for asbestos
exposure victims.
These issues are founded in case law and solid legal theory,
5

not merely upon "unsubstantiated opinions or beliefs" (Brief of
Appellees at 13). As such, Plaintiffs request a review of the
evidence and authorities in the light most favorable to them, and
that the District Court's granting of summary judgment be
reversed.
II.

PLAINTIFFS1 INJURIES SHOULD BE
RECOGNIZED AND COMPENSATED.

Plaintiffs1 inhalation of asbestos at the Mountain Fuel
building resulted in immediate and prolonged coughing, wheezing,
chest tightness, headache, respiratory distress and eye pain.
(R. 251, 242-43, 271-72, 309-310, 321, 328). While these
reactions may simply be characterized as symptoms of asbestos
exposure, they may also be fairly characterized as injuries in
and of themselves.

Certainly, the coughing, wheezing, headaches,

eye irritation, etc., is no less of an injury than are minor cuts
and bruises which are commonly compensated in other personal
injury actions.

As Judge Handler points out, "to deny redress

for (their) injuries merely because damages cannot be measured
with precise exactitude would constitute a perversion of
fundamental principles of justice."

Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J.

421, 433, 404, A.2d 8 (1979) (Handler, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Judge Handler further stressed, in Ayers v. Jackson
Township, 106 N.J. 557, 318 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987), that "it is
self-evident that exposure to highly toxic chemicals is the
infliction of harm, an invasion of a legally protected interest."
318 A.2d at 317.

Likewise, the Plaintiffs suffered the invasion
6

of asbestos fibers the moment the fibers were inhaled.

Judge

Handler further stated,
The injury involved is an actual event: exposure
to toxic chemicals. The tortious contamination,
moreover, is an event that has surely occurred; it is
not a speculative or remote possible happening. Among
the consequences of this unconsented-to invasion are
... a tangible risk of a major disease, a peril that is
real even though it cannot be precisely measured or
weighed. The peril, moreover, is unquestionably
greater than that experienced by persons not similarly
exposed to toxic chemicals."
Id. at 319.
The Plaintiffs' risk is similarly high.
never leave the lung tissue once inhaled.

Asbestos fibers

Unlike toxic chemicals

which one's body may excrete over time, asbestos fibers remain
and frequently cause a plethora of respiratory ailments and
carcinomas.

The victims have only to await the fateful day of

their diagnosis.

Medical surveillance and early detection are

their only hope.
Many courts and legal commentators have addressed the tort
law's seeming inability to adjust to the modern age of toxic
torts and latent disease manifestation.
American courts are struggling to accommodate
common law tort doctrine to the peculiar
characteristics of toxic substance litigation. There
is considerable debate among those involved in the day
to day dealings with personal injuries from the
industrial processes and products....In large part, the
problem has been how to adapt traditional tort rules to
toxic exposure cases-cases involving fact scenarios
that were wholly unforeseen when these rules were
originally formulated.
Note, Increased Risk of Future Disease, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 1081,
1090-1091 (1989).
7

Defendants suggest that Plaintiffs' action for injury is
premature and that the discovery rule will allow the Plaintiffs
to recover when and if disease manifests itself•

(Brief of

Appellees at 12). Tolling of statutes of limitation by the
discovery rule until serious disease manifests itself is o:„a step
courts have taken in an attempt to deal with the latent effects
of asbestos disease and preserve a toxic tort victim's cause of
action.

However, future compensation is doubtful.

Critical

evidence is lost when plaintiffs are forced to wait years to
litigate.

The 2 0 to 3 0

year latency period is a practically

insurmountable barrier to proving causation.

Additionally,

res

judicata may completely bar a future law suit if a plaintiff has
brought an earlier action to recover other damages from exposure.
Rosenberg,

The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A

"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv.L.Rev. 849, 920
(1984).

Therefore, tolling of the statute cannot be viewed as

the answer to toxic tort claims absent disease.

Compensation for

victims is doubtful and the tort law's objective of deterrence is
unfulfilled.
Another theory adopted by some courts for dealing with toxic
torts is that of increased risk of future disease.

Under this

damage theory, a plaintiff must prove that the future disease is
more likely than not to occur.

If the plaintiff can prove that,

he will then recover full damages as if he had the actual
disease.

A minority of courts will reduce damages by the

percentage probability that the plaintiff will not contract the
8

disease - once the likelihood of disease is proven to be greater
than 50%. Marchant, Baram, The Use of Risk Assessment Evidence
to Prove Increased Risk and Alternative Causation in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 40 FICC Quarterly 95, 97-100 (1990).

In either case,

if the plaintiff cannot reach the greater than 50% threshold, he
will recover nothing.

Some courts view this threshold as

unreasonably high, and have considered sub-cellular and genetic
damage as triggering occurrences for recoverability.

Id. at 100-

101.
Courts that recognize increased risk actions have adopted
varying theories of what constitutes a present injury.

Some

courts require a physical manifestation of an injury in order to
recover while others have no such requirement in regards to toxic
torts.

Among the latter, the mere exposure to asbestos qualifies

as an injury1 or the increased risk of disease itself satisfies
the injury requirement.2

Other courts treat general symptoms

such as dizziness, headaches and nausea as sufficient present
injury for increased risk recovery.3

Id.

Under these

precedents, which represent the minority, plaintiffs may be able
^-Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. , 761 F.2d 1129, 1137
(5th Cir. 1985)
2

Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 82 (3rd Cir.
1986); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287,
305 (1987); Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr.
885 (Cal. App. 1990).
3

Haqerty v. L&L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 317
(5th Cir. 1986); Villari v. Terminex Int'l Inc., 692 F. Supp.
568, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
9

to sustain an action for increased risk.

However, once again,

the likelihood of proving greater than 50% probability that each
of the plaintiffs will contract cancer or asbestosis is grimm.
Therefore, Plaintiffs have chosen not to pursue damages foi
increased risk as Defendants suggest, because the burden ot proof
is too high and incompatible with toxic exposure.

Rather,

Plaintiffs seek to recover for injuries sustained at the time of
exposure.
III.

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES
FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.

Under current Utah law of negligent infliction of emotional
distress, a present injury is required.

However, Plaintiffs

encourage the Court to recognize the almost insurmountable
barriers faced by toxic tort victims.

In recognition of this,

Plaintiffs encourage the use of two theories which may reduce the
burden of proof to a reasonable level wherein legitimate victims
can be compensated for their actual harms.
First, the Court should allow the verifiable and significant
exposure of a victim to toxic/carcinogenic substances as meeting
the barrier requirement for injury.

This view is supported by

Brafford v. Susguehar-a Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D.C. Colo. 1984).
Secondly, Plaintiffs encourage the Court to focus on the
negligence of the defendants which resulted in the emotional
distress.

The fact that there was a duty which was negligently

breached should mitigate the requirement of present injury.
view is represented in the recent case of Gerardi v. Nuclear
10

This

Utility Services, 566 N.Y.S. 2d 1002 (Sup. 1991), wherein the
Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims of
emotional distress.

The facts of Gerardi are similar in that the

defendant owed the plaintiffs a duty and negligently breached
that duty.

Like Mountain Fuel, the Gerardi defendants

negligently failed to warn their workers of the asbestos, during
a renovation project.

The case at hand is even more egregious in

that the defendants falsely denied the presence of asbestos when
they were confronted with it.

The Gerardi Court opined that, "in

the circumstances where a duty is owed by a defendant to
plaintiff, breach of that duty resulting directly in emotional
harm is compensable though no physical injury has occurred." Id.
at 1005 (cites omitted).
Defendants claim that should the trial court's decision be
overturned concerning emotional distress, "it would invite an
unlimited number of claims for emotional distress, an injury that
is easily feigned". (Brief of the Appellees at 28).

A number of

well reasoned cases have pointed out two factors of toxic tort
cases which will limit "spurious" claims and allow only
legitimate emotional distress to be compensated.

In order to

recover for emotional distress most courts require an injury.
Plaintiffs have been injured by the exposure of their bodies to
lethal fibers.

The invasion is an actual event which has

undisputedly occurred.

The courts, in requiring an injury, are

looking for an actual verifiable event whereby unfounded or
spurious claims may be weeded out.
11

The invasion of the body by a

known carcinogenic offender provides such a verifiable event.
The actual event of exposure to a toxic substance provides "a
certain guarantee" that plaintiffs1 "fear is genuine".

Potter v.

Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885, 891 (Ca App.
6 Dist. 1990) (Plaintiffs allowed to recover for emotional
distress for exposure to hazardous chemicals absent present
physical injury).
The second barrier to spurious claims is the reasonableness
of the Plaintiff's emotional anxiety.

This may be established by

evidence of the increased risk of cancer or other serious
diseases.
"In fear of cancer claims the central focus
is not on the underlying odds that the future
disease will in fact materialize. The
plaintiffs increased risk need only be
reasonable and reasonable in this context is
not equivalent to probability or certainty,
but is for a fact-finder to determine."
Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 647 F.Supp. 303
(W.D.Tenn 1986),
1988).

Rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.

See, also, LaVelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,

30 Ohio Misc.2d 11,
County 1987).

507 N.E.2d 476, 481 (C.P. Cayahoga

Clearly, Plaintiffs1 emotional distress is

reasonable, based upon their vastly increased risk of
developing cancer or serious diseases incident to their toxic
exposure.
IV.

MEDICAL SURVEILLANCE DAMAGES ARE
REASONABLE AND NECESSARY.

Plaintiffs are entitled to medical monitoring damages
12

because they meet the criteria that have recently evolved in
toxic tort cases. Most courts which have recently examined
the issue of medical surveillance damages have boiled their
analysis down to essentially three elements.
the victim to recover they must show:
hazardous/toxic substance;

(2)

In order for

(1) exposure to

the latent potential for

injury or increased risk of disease due to the nature of the
exposure; and (3) the medical necessity of early detection.
These elements are set out in Merry v. Westincrhouse Elec.
Corp., 684 F.Supp. 847, 850 (M.D. Pa. 1988) and supported by
considerable case law.4
Like most toxic tort victims, Plaintiffs can easily
establish the first two elements through the facts of the
case by proving they have been exposed to a toxic substance
which is known to cause serious disease.

The medical

necessity and reasonableness of medical monitoring for these
Plaintiffs is supported by the facts of this case remaining
an issue for the trier of fact.
4

See, Ayers v. Jackson Township, 189 N.J. Super. 561,
461 A.2d 184, 190 (1983); Habitants Against Landfill Toxants
v. City of York, No. 84-5-3820 (York Co. May 20, 1985) 15
Envtl.L.Rep. 20937 and Villari v. Terminex. Inc., 663 F.Supp.
727, 735 n. 5 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Friends for All Children, Inc.
v. Lockheed Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See, also.
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d
Cir. 1990); Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility Services, 566 N.Y.S.
2d 1002 (Sup. 1991); Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d
79 (3rd Cir. 1986); Askev v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 477
N.Y.S. 2d 242, 102 A.D.2d 130 (1984); Barth v. Firestone Tire
and Rubber Co., 661 F.Supp. 193 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Mauro v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 225 N.J.Super. 196, 542 A.2d
16 (1988); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J.Super.
556, 495 A.2d 495 (1985),
13

Defendants down play the necessity of medical monitoring.
However a survey of medical literature indicates that
monitoring for those with asbestos exposure is a medical
necessity.

The range of potential disease that the

Plaintiffs are now at risk include; in-the-lung malignant
mesothelioma; bronchial carcinoma, diffused pleural
thickening, discrete pleural thickening (plaques), benign
pleural effusion, asbestosis (fibrosis).

There is also

compelling evidence that asbestos exposure increases the risk
of developing cancer of the colon, stomach, rectum, kidney,
larynx and respiratory tract.

Selikoff, I.J., Hammond, E.C.,

Seidman, H., Mortality Experience of Insulation Workers in
the United States and Canada, 1943-1976.

330 Ann NY Acad Sci

91, 91-116 (1979).
Dr. Battigelli told the Plaintiffs that their exposure to
asbestos was "perhaps inconsequential", (R.373).

Dr.

Battigelli's opinion to the Plaintiffs flies in the face of
the bulk of medical research and literally hundreds of
articles and works documenting the lethal pathology of
asbestos in the body.

It is generally accepted that intense

exposure to asbestos in even relatively short periods of time
has potentially fatal consequences.

The New York Academy of

Sciences has reported that exposure to asbestos "for as short
a period as one month showed a clear excess risk of cancer.
With longer direct exposure (i.e. 2 months, 3 months, 6
months and so on) the cancer risk became greater."
14

Selikoff,

et al., supra at 61.
Because of the insidious nature of asbestos related
disease, medical surveillance after exposure is vital.
Although asbestos diseases are ultimately incurable, their
early detection can lead to a decrease in premature morbidity
and mortality.

The early detection of cancer can improve

prognosis and short-term morbidity.

Early recognition of

non-malignant disease can result in preventative and rapid
treatment measures for pulmonary infections.

G. Peters & B.

Peters, Asbestos Disease Update 118 - 121 (1989) .
Despite Defendants suggestion, medical monitoring for
asbestos disease goes beyond the scope of routine medical
check-ups.

The standards established by the government for

exposed workers specifies that special attention be paid to
the pulmonary, cardiovascular and gastrointestinal systems by
specialized physicians.

Peters, supra, at 124. A medical

monitoring program must be tailored to each victim.

Common

elements would likely include an extensive
medical/occupational history and examination, two view chest
x-rays, spirometry, radiography and examinations with an
occupational medicine specialist, pulmonologist and
radiologist with experience in reading chest films for
pneumoconiosis.

Id.

Frequency of examinations depend on

risk factors (i.e. age, exposure) determined

from

the

occupational history and baseline examination. Jd. at
125.
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The Defendants suggest that medical surveillance damages
are speculative and as such should not be allowed under Utah
law. (Brief of Appellees at 3 0).

Many courts and legal

commentators believe that medical monitoring damages are
lawful and appropriate damages for toxic tort victims.

e

third circuit opined that medical surveillance damages are a
less speculative claim, "because the issue for the jury is
the less conjectural question of whether the plaintiff needs
medical surveillance. " In Re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation,
916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990).

Paoli is a case wherein

the plaintiffs were exposed to the carcinogenic toxin PCB.
The Court acknowledged the many policy reasons for medical
monitoring in ffa toxic age" and stated that, "recognizing
this tort does not require courts to speculate about the
probability of future injury.

It merely requires courts to

ascertain the probability that the far less costly remedy of
medical supervision is appropriate".

Id. at 852.

The focus in Paoli was properly placed on plaintiffs need for
medical surveillance.
Defendants have pointed out that the majority of cases
awarding surveillance damages have dealt with exposure to
toxic chemicals.

Asbestos is similar to the carcinogenic

chemicals in the chemical exposure cases cited because
asbestos exposure also results in sub-cellular changes and
cancer.

Asbestos exposure may also be distinguished from

chemical exposure in that research has found that where
16

carcinogenic chemicals may be eliminated by the body through
time, asbestos will remain embedded in the body tissue
because of the nature of the microscopic fibre.
Defendants place much emphasis on the case of DeStories v.
City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705 (Ariz. App. 1987) for the
argument that plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover for
medical monitoring.

DeStories is an asbestos exposure case,

but one that is isolated and seems out of step with much of
the current legal thought.

More recent cases encourage the

public policy arguments of corporate responsibility.
Mountain fuel has received the benefits of the asbestos at
their facility and now should be held responsible for the
harm.
The more recent case of Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility
Services, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. 1991)
the present case.

is very similar

to

The workers in Gerardi were enveloped by a

large cloud of asbestos dust during a pipe renovation
project.

The workers inhaled or ingested asbestos during

that limited exposure.

The workers in Gerardi, at the time

of their complaint, were not currently suffering disease nor
were they disabled.

The Court, however, denied the

defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' cause of action for
medical surveillance damages.

The Court stated, "that the

allowance of damages for medical monitoring expenses due to
negligent exposure to toxic substances was granted on the
basis that such a remedy would permit the early detection and
17

treatment of maladies that as a matter of public policy the
tort-feasor should bear the cost".

Gerardi, at 1004.

Gerardi is very similar to the case at hand in that
Plaintiffs have been negligently exposed to and ingested
concentrated amounts of asbestos dust.

Plaintiffs are a so

currently suffering no visible disease or disability.
Similarly, Plaintiffs should be allowed to recover for the
necessary expenses of medical monitoring.

At the very least

a genuine issue of fact regarding the necessity and
reasonableness of medical monitoring precludes summary
judgment and this case should be remanded back to the trial
court.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs in this case have demonstrated many issues of
genuine fact.

Accordingly, the District Court improperly

dismissed their claims for personal injury and emotional
distress.

Plaintiffs1 claim for medical surveillance damages

was also improperly dismissed.

There is evidence before the

court that medical monitoring for these Plaintiffs is
reasonable and necessary because of their exposure to
asbestos at Mountain Fuel.
This case presents many public policy issues. We live in a
"toxic age" wherein one entity's irresponsibility with toxic
materials may result in the disease and early death of many
persons.

The tort system attempts to hold offenders

responsible for their actions through deterrence and
18

compensation.
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